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NOTES
ABUSES OF MILITARY POWER AND ITS PUNISH ENT.-With the
dawn of peace brushing over a war-torn world the people of the United
States and all warring powers are confronted with the problem of the
punishment of the abusers of military powers. As man has progressed
along the road of civilization it has appeared to him that wars have
been and are being waged more humanely. Today, contrary to practices employed in earlier times when wars were waged, prisoners are
not sold into slavery and the property of the vanquished nation is not
confiscated by and apportioned among the victors. But, upon a closer
examination, it appears that the character of war has changed. Modern
scientific improvements have made wars national programs involving
the entire population of the nation, as against the type of war waged
in the days when chivalry prevailed. Today, not as then, do we have
standard armaments and professional soldiers of fortune to do our
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fighting. Instead we find secret weapons and defenses a common-place
thing in the scheme of twentieth century warfare and a system which
engulfs and makes an active part of the war of every citizen, from the
tiller of the soil to the industrial magnate. It would seem that man has
been misled by some will o' the wisp subterfuge concerning the humaneness of war in our times.
The abuses of military powers are many, but for our consideration
we will concern ourselves with only a few of the more outstanding infamies. Among these are the killing and robbery of defenseless prisoners of war, the ,violation of a flag of truce, or the commission of any
acts of treachery or perfidy.'
The punishment of the abuses of military powers mentioned above
fall under the following general rule: The principles of international
law can be enforced by the separate nations and the means are immaterial. 2 It is inferrable from this that either nation engaged in the
war may punish such acts whenever and in whatever manner possible.
To illustrate this point a German case which happened during the last
war should be cited.3 During World War I, complaints were made by
the British to the high German authorities against a non-commissioned
officer in charge of prisoners of war, charging that he consistently mistreated British prisoners of war. He was removed from his command,
court-martialed, and sentenced by the German Military Authorities.
Our own Supreme Court has taken a similar view when it said "courtmartials are lawful tribunals." 4 To point out the fact that a victor nation may punish abuses of military powers we cite 5- "In regard to the
application of the laws of war to enemies in arms, and their operation
under a state of military government and martial law, it will have been
seen that classes of persons who in our law may become subject to the
military commissions are the following: 1. Individuals of the enemy's
army who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offenses in
violation with the laws of war."
The question immediately comes up for consideration: Is the individual soldier committing acts contrary to the rules and customs of
war to be held liable for such acts when he is acting upon specific command of a superior officer? We need not go far, as far only as our own
courts of justice, to see that the general rule answers this question in
the negative. 6 This answer is no more than reasonable, for if a mili1 Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd Ed., Vols. 1 and 2, p. 839 and
following.
2 .Blackstone's Commentaries on International Law, Vol. 1, p. 78; VanDeventer v. Hancke, Transvool (1903) Sup. Cit. 401; Jager v. Atty. General Natal,
L. R. (1907) App. 326.
3 German War Trials, British Parliament, (C. D. 1450), 1921, p. 8.
4 Graften v. U. S., 206 U. S. 333 (1907).
5 Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd Ed. Vols. 1 and 2, p. 838.

6 Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424 (1901); Riggs v. State, 3 Caldwell 85

(Tenn.) (1866-).

NOTES
tary regime were to be founded on the basis that the individual soldier,
at all times, had to suffer with his commanding officer for the commission of wrongful acts authorized by the officer, then the discipline
among the individual soldiers would be very lax and no form of order
righteous or otherwise - would be properly carried out.
There is, however, an exception to the general rule for a subordinate
who acts in conformity with orders which he knows involve a military
or civil crime or misdemeanor is liable to punishment as an accom7
plice.
An altogether unique situation presented itself in the following case.8
When an officer in the army of the United States committed an offense
against a native of the Philippines nothing could be done. The offense
was against the laws of war but since peace had been made he could
not be tried by a military commission. The U. S. courts could not try
him because the offense took place in the Philippines. The Philippine
courts couldn't try him because he was a part of the U. S. Army of Occupation. No court martial had any jurisdiction over him because he
had left military service. It appears, therefore, that any criminal procedure against members of the armed forces who have been allegedly
committing acts in violation of the laws of war must be brought during
the actual progress of the war, before hostilities have ceased.
After having considered all the possibilities of punishing abusers of
war powers, it seems that the only iron-clad policy that can be had
must be attained by treaty. A very good example of the achievement of
such methods is found in the following commentary:-The principle
that individuals belonging to the armed and naval forces of the adversary are responsible under the criminal law for offenses against the
laws and customs of war and may be tried and punished for such acts
was first recognized in 1919 at the Treaty of Versailles between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers. The treaty declared Germany "recognizes" the right of the Allies to bring before military
tribunals persons having committed acts in violation of the laws and
customs of war. This clause applied notwithstanding any prosecution
before a tribunal in Germany and further required Germany to hand
over all persons accused of having committed such acts. 9
-

Eugene C. Wohihorn.
Norbert S. Wleklinski.

COMPENSATION

OF A RESIGNING

EXECUTOR, ADMINISTRATOR

OR

TRusTE.-Generally, where an administrator or executor is removed,
or resigns before complete administration it is a matter of judicial disBritish Retaliatory Orders in Council of 1807, pp. 13-15.
Ops. Attorney-General 570.
9 Garner: International Law and the World War, § 581.
7
8
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cretion as to whether compensation shall be allowed, and in what
amount, within statutory limits. Compensation has been denied.'
Courts have exercised their discretion by apportioning compensation
between successive administrators or executors.2
An executor who claims compensation although he has resigned
his trust before fully administering the estate should present the court
with facts which will enable it to exercise its discretion rationally and
the allowance to him should never be liberal because a large allowance
might prove detrimental to the estate itself, or unjust to its successor
in administration. 3
In the case of In Re Peercy,4 where a successor had been appointed
as administrator for a person who failed to keep accounts, and mingled
the proceeds of the estate with his own funds, the court brought out
the fact that the former administrator was not entitled to the statutory
commision but,. to a part thereof as the court might apportion to him
upon due consideration of the rights of successive administrators.
The question of allowance of compensation to executors or administrators who have resigned or been removed is frequently one primarily
of statutory construction. Thus, a statute regulating settlement of
the estates of deceased persons and allowing executors or administrators, as compensation "commissions upon the whole of the estate,
accounted for" by them and requiring them to take into possession
all of the estate, real and personal, has been held to apply only to those
cases where the administration is complete and the estate finally
settled. Where it allows compensation to an executor at the rates
established; upon the whole value of the estate, it does not mean
that the rate of compensation may be allowed to a succession of administrators of the same estate, since if this were true the estate
might be consumed thereby; so that in such a case (where an administrator resigns or is removed, leaving the administration incomplete) it is the duty of the probate court to apportion the compensation. 5
In Massachusetts, an executor was held not entitled to compensation (it being held that there was nothing to show that the court has
erroneously disallowed compensation), where he was removed for
not rendering an account to the probate court, as required by law,
and an administrator de bonis non appointed, although the executor
had rendered services in collecting rents and endeavoring to make a
sale of the real estate 6
Hermann's Estate, 226 Pa. 543, 7.5Ati. 731 (1910).
Re Owen, 32 Utah 469, 91 Pac. 283 (1907); Brossman v. Fox, 52 App. D. C.
143, 284 Fed. 923 (1922).
3 Cherry v. Jarratt, 25 Miss. 221 (1852).
4 168 Cal. 750, 145 Pac. 88 (1914).
5 Ord. v. Little, 3 Cal. 287 (1853); In Re Puncy (Citation 4).
6 Brooks v. Jackson, 125 Mass. 307 (1878).
1
2

NOTES
In cases of resignation or removal of an administrator or executor
the question has sometimes arisen as to whether compensation may
be allowed prior to the completion of administration. It has been
held that the removed administrator is not entitled to compensation
until the estate is finally settled. It seems that a public administrator,
regularly appointed by the court, is entitled, in proceedings authorized
by law for his removal not only reimbursement for his proper and nec-7
essary costs and expenses, but also compensation for services rendered.
Where a testamentary trustee resigns for personal reasons; leaving
the trust to be executed by others, the allowance of compensation and
its amount are discretionary with the court,8 and if compensation is
allowed it must be measured by a different rule from that which the
law applied when the trusts have been fully executed, and the trustee
accepts the compensation awarded him, if any is awarded, as one of
the terms or conditions of his discharge. 9
On application of executors and testamentary trustees for leave
to resign, the court if it permits the resignation can impose a condition that the trustee's commissions upon. the principal of the trust
shall be waived.10 The general rule that commissions are not allowable to a trustee out of the corpus of the trust estate until final determination of the trusts and distribution of the assets has been held
not to apply where the trustee is discharged upon his own request or
agreement with the cestui que trust.
In the case of successive administrators, executors, or trustees,
the compensation should be apportioned, each being entitled to compensation adjusted to the rights of the others. 1 The circumstances
attending the removal may, however, be such as to deprive the trustee
of the right to compensation on the corpus of the estate.' 2 Furthermore, a trustee by resigning may deprive himself of commissions on
the corpus of the estate. 13 It was held, however, that a testamentary
trustee does not forfeit his right to commission for receiving the principal of the trust estate merely because he brings an action for leave to
account and to resign the trust, when during the pendency of the
action, and before leave to resign is granted, the trustee dies, since
his action amounts to nothing more than an expression of his will to
14
resign and he is still in office at the time of his death.
In other cases, questions have arisen of a distinctive and varied
nature. Where a testamentary trustee, prior to his removal from
7

8

9
10

11
12
13

14

Re Jones, 166 Cal. 147, 135 Pac. 293 (1913).
Re Strong, 19 Cal. 663, 51 P. 1078 (1898).
Re Allen, 96 N. Y. 327 (1884).
Re Curtis, 15 Misc. 545, 37 N. Y. S. 586 (1896).
Re Leavitt, 8 Cal. App. 756, 97 P. 916 (1908).
Comet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916).
Re Williams Gurgh Trust Co., 72 Misc. 595, 131 N. Y. S. 989 (1911).
Lensly v. Bogert, 87 Hun. 137, 33 N. Y. S. 975 (1895).
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office on account of conviction of a criminal offense, had voluntarily
paid the life beneficiary the entire income from the estate 1' it was
held that the surrogate court had no jurisdiction to direct commissions to be paid to such removed trustee by his successor, but that,
if any right to payment of commissions upon the income existed, the
same right be asserted in another forum, broad enough to enforce
its decree.
In Haord v. Bradbury,16 under a statute providing that upon
petition of a trustee of an express trust, a court having jurisdiction may
accept his resignation and discharge him from the trust upon such
terms as the rights of the persons interested in the trust may require,
it was held that where a trustee files his resignation and a successor
is appointed, his claim for compensation is a matter properly included
in his report so that an adjudication on such a report was final, as
regards the rights to issue execution thereon.
William O'Connell.
JURISDICTION OF EQUITY To PROTECT PERSONAL RIGHTS.-In recent
years, personal rights have assumed a more important and recognized
place in the field of law. It appears that there is a growing tendency
on the part of courts of equity to repudiate the theory that equity has
jurisdiction to protect and enforce only property rights, and expressly
to recognize the doctrine that personal rights stand on at least as
high a plane as property rights, and often cannot be adequately protected except in a court of equity.
The court's construction and interpretation of the word "property"
is sometimes the guiding factor in this type case. The Restatement
of Trusts ' defines property as, "The term 'property' denotes interests in things and not the things themselves." The Indiana courts 2
have construed property as, "Word 'property' in its legal sense means
valuable right or interest in thing, rather than thing itself." Other
authorities 3 have stated that "property" does not mean physical object itself but certain rights over object, and is the right to possession,
use, and disposition of thing in such manner as is not inconsistent with
law. "Property" is entirely the creature of the law. There is no form
or color or visible trace by which it is possible to express the relation
which constitutes property. It belongs not to physics but to metaphysics, and is altogether a creature of the mind. It is nothing more
than the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a
thing.
15
16

Re Bevuir, 17 Misc. 486, 41 N. Y. S. 268 (1896).
156 Ind. 30, 59 N. E. 31 (1901).

Restatement of Trust, § 2 (c).
2 Meek v. State, 185 N. E. 899, 205 Ind. 102 (1933).
2 Words and Phrases, Vol. 34.
1

NOTES
It is interesting to note the distinction of--"What is a property
right?", in a review of English and American cases. In reviewing
the English case of Sports & General Press Agency, Limited, v. Our
Dogs' Publ. Cl., Limited,4 and comparing this case and other English
cases with the majority of American cases it is clear to see that there
is a clear split of judicial opinion regarding what constitutes a property
right. The facts .€ere as follows in the leading English case: "The
plaintiffs, the Sports & General Press Agency, Ltd., were a publishing
company carrying on business in London, and the defendants, who
carried on business in Manchester, were the publishers and proprietors
of Our Dogs, a weekly illustrated journal devoted solely to dogs. One
Thomas Fall, bought from the Ladies' Kennel Association, "the sole
photographic rights in connection with" a dog show organized by the
association. Fall then sold his rights to the plaintiff. The defendant's
agent had bought a ticket to the show and proceeded to take pictures
of the dogs over the violent objections of the plaintiff and the representatives of the Ladies' Kennel Association. The defendant had been
warned previously and had also been warned at this particular time
against taking pictures of the dog show.
In deciding the case, Judge Horridge. held that: "in my view,
therefore, the plaintiffs have no right of property which the defendThe English judge held that the
ants have knowingly infringed."
"sole exclusive right to take pictures" was not a property right.
The court made other remarks which are quite interesting in a
discussion of property rights. The court stated in its dictum as follows: "If any person were to be in a position, for example from the
top of a house, to photograph the show from outside it, the association
would have had no right to stop him. In my judgment no one possesses a right of preventing another person photographing him any
more than he has the right of preventing another person giving a description of him, providing the description is not libellous or otherwise wrongful. These rights do not exist. As, therefore, the Ladies'
Kennel Association had no exclusive right to take photographs I do
not think they could grant, as property, the exclusive photographic
rights as they purported to do."
An American case of PittsburghAthletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting
Company 5 held contra to the remarks made by the English judge.
In this case the Pittsburgh baseball team's play-by-play description was
being broadcast by a company having the "exclusive right to broadcast, play-by-play, descriptions or accounts of the games played by
the 'Pirates' at this and other fields.?' The General Mills Company
and the National Broadcasting Company had given a very valuable
4 Sports & General Press Agency v. Our Dogs Publ. Co., L. 1. (1916); 2
K. B. 880.
5 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 Fed. Supp. 490 (1938).
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consideration for this right. The defendants arranged to get a playby-play description of the game through stationing spotters at various
advantageous places outside the baseball park and broadcasting from
outside the park. Suit was brought to enjoin the defendants from this
practice and the court granted an injunction. The court held as follows: "This right the defendant interferes with. when it uses its broadcasting facilities for giving out the identical news obtained by its paid
observers stationed at points outside Forbes Field for the purpose of
securing information which it cannot otherwise acquire. This, in our
judgment, amounts to unfair competition, and is a violation of the
property rights of the plaintiffs."
It would seem in the English case that the court kept in its mind
the fact that the defendant bought a ticket and because of his ticket
he had a property right in the dog show as opposed to the owner. In
the English case of Hurst v. Picture Theatres,6 the court discussed
this very problem of ticket and property right with regard to the
rights of one to buy a ticket and see an entertainment performance. In
this case the court held that a spectator in a theater, properly dressed
and well behaved, had a propery right to remain.
The decision in the majority of United States' courts is contra
as evidenced by the case of Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton.7 Here
the court held: "In the absence of some statutory regulation or restriction to the contrary, places of amusement and entertainment stand
on the same basis as any other private business, and are under the
sole control of the proprietor or manager, who may admit or exclude
whomsoever he chooses. Nor is the rule affected by the fact that the
patron is the holder of a ticket. The ticket does not confer right to
enter or remain in the theater if the holder is not disorderly or otherwise objectionable."
From a review of these cases it seems clear that the court's decisions
are based upon the definition of what is a property right. The English
courts hold that the holder of a ticket has a property interest. In the
United States, the courts hold that the holder of a ticket has no property
right and is in fact a mere licensee. It is the property owner who is
to determine as to the use of his property and the persons permitted
to use the property. It is the landlord and owner, rather than the
outside party, that holds the property interest.
Although the courts have been reluctant to admit that equity had
jurisdiction to enforce or protect merely personal rights, and have
usually discovered at least a nominal property right on which to base
the granting of equitable relief, there are a few cases in which the
courts have had the courage openly to repudiate the doctrine that
6 Hurst v. Pictures Theatres, 1 K. B. 1 (1915).
7 Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 246 Ky. 130, 54 S. W. 2d 620 (1932).
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only property rights will be protected, and to assert the jurisdiction
of a court of equity to protect personal rights also. 8
An unusual case of the exercise of equitable power to protect personal rights is Ex parte Warfield,9 in which it was held that an injunction in favor of a husband, who had brought an action for partial
alienation of his wife's affections, could be granted to prevent the defendant from writing to, speaking to, or talking with her, or from
visiting the house where she stayed, in order to prevent him from
exercising undue influence over her; and for violating such an injunction the defendant was punished for contempt. The court said:
"Formerly, it seemed to be the rule that courts would only interfere
where some property right or interest was involved, but now it seems
the writ will be .applied to an innumerable variety of cases, in which
really no property right is involved. While in some of the cases the
courts appear to adhere to the old rule, yet when we look at the case
it is difficult to see any question of a property right, but a vain endeavor on the part of the court to adhere to the old doctrine, while
it reaches out for the protection of some personal right."
Regarding the right of privacy, the dissenting judge in the, case
of Schuyler v. Curtis 10 stated: "I cannot see why the right of privacy
is not a form of property, as much as is the right of complete immunity
of one's person." Other cases such as Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co.," holding that the unauthorized publication of one's likeness
by another person, for advertising purposes, would not support a suit
for an injunction on the theory that it was an invasion of a "right of
privacy," are not decided, apparently, on the theory that equity will
not protect personal rights, but on the ground that there is no right
of privacy which justified the granting of the injunction.
It seems from a review of the cases that there are two reasons why
courts differ regarding equity jurisdiction in personal right cases.
It is frequently asserted doctrine that equity has jurisdiction only to
enforce or protect property rights, and has not jurisdiction where
merely personal rights are involved. Some courts hold strictly to
this view, although the swing of the law is to a more liberal and practical point of view. The other factor causing a divergence of opinion
is the court's construction of what is a property right. If the court
gives a broad liberal construction of the term "property" it can be
seen that the courts holding for enforcement of only property rights
have an opportunity here to classify the right as a "property right"
in order to do more complete justice.
Robert A. Oberfell.
8 American Law Report, Vol. 14, p. 300.

9 Ex parte Warfield, 50 S. W. 933, 76 Amer. St. Rep. 724 (1899).
10 Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434,42 N. E. 22 (1895).
11 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902).
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MICHIGAN STATE LAWS ON DowER AND CURTESY, WITH RESPECT

TO DEATH DUTIES.-The Michigan Inheritance Tax laws,' in Section

7.562, Section 2, cover the subject, as follows: "Exemptions and Limitations - Transfer to Husband or Wife - First, (b) Where the transfer is to a husband or a wife such transfer of property of the clear market value of $30,000 shall be exempt from all taxation under this act.
In event no property is transfered to any minor child or children, the
widow shall be entitled to an additional exemption of $5000 for each
such child to whom no property is transferred.
"Tax Rate on Excess; 'Widow's Allowance - Second, In case the
clear market value of the property transferred to each individual of the
persons included in the classes specified in paragraph One (above)
hereof exceeds the exemption specified in paragraph One, such exemptions shall first be exempted therefrom; where the clear market value
of such property shall not exceed $50,000 before deducting such exemptions the transfer of such property in excess of the exemptions herein
provided, and up to $50,000 shall be taxed under this act at the rate
of 2 percentum of the clear market value thereof" (from here I shall
tabulate the remainder)
Clear Market Value

Tax Rate (for excess over
exemptions)
$ 50,000 ..............
$250,000
4%
250,000 ..............
500,000
5%
500,000 ------------750,000
6%
750,000 ............................
8%
"Provided; that portion of the property so transferred so (to) each
individual of the persons included in the classes specified in paragraph
One hereof, which consists of real estate, shall be taxable at threequarters (3/4) the rates specified in this act. In determining the tax
payable under this act, the property subject to tax shall be deemed to
consist of real and personal property in the proportions that the clear
market value of such real property and such personal property, respectively, bear to the clear market value of the total property so transferred.
"The exemptions of - paragraph One of section two of this act shall
apply and be granted to each beneficiary's interest therein, and not to
the entire estate of a decedent. No deductions or exemptions from such
tax shall be made for any allowance granted by the order of any court
for the maintenance and support of the widow or family of a decedent
pending the administration of the estate when there is income from such
1

Mich. Stat. Anno., 1936-1943.

NOTES
estate accruing after death, which is available to pay such allowance,
or for a longer period than one year, or for a greater amount than is
actually used and expended for the maintenance and support of such
widow or family for one year."
To compare the tax rate of widows or widowers with the regular
tax rate, I shall go on:
"Third - (a) Except as hereinafter provided, in cases other than
those specified in paragraph two hereof, the tax shall be at the rate of
10 percentum of the clear market value of the property transferred not
exceeding $50,000. (b) Upon all in excess of $50,000, and up to
$500,000, 12 percentum. (c) Upon all in excess of $500,000, 15 percentum."
In tracing the history of Michigan's "Dower and Curtesy Policy,"
with respect to death duties, we find that the act as it stands now is
much more complicated than it has been in the past.
In the 1929 Public Acts, No. 35, under the present Clause two,
the tax rates were 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8% respectively, instead of 2, 4, 5,
6, and 8%, as they are now. Under Clause Three (a) the rate was 5%
instead of 10%, and under (b), 10% instead of 12%, as at present.
In other respects the section was the same as the above.
In the 1923 Public Acts, No. 257, under the present clause One (b)
the exempt transfer was only to a wife, rather than to a husband or
wife, as at present, and the amount so exempted only less than $10,000,
rather than $30,000, as at present. There was no provision that when
no property was transferred to any minor child or children the widow
was entitled to the present additional exemption of $5,000 for each
child to whom no property was transferred. Under Clause two this act
did provide for the deduction of the exemption from the $50,000, but
taxed the entire $50,000 at the rate of 1 percentum; then, from $50,000
to $250,000 at the rate of 2% of the clear market value thereof; from
$250,000 to $500,000 at the rate of 4% of the clear market value
thereof, etc. as in the 1929 act. No provision was made for taxing real
property at 3/4 of its value. Under Clause three, the rate was the
same as in the 1929 act.
Under the 1919 act, the property was not taxable under the act
unless it was personal property to the clear market value of $2000 or
over, and when the transfer was to a wife it was not to be taxable unless it was personal property to the clear market value of $5000, in
which cases the entire transfer was to be taxed at the rate of 1%. In
other cases the rate was to be 5 %:
In one Michigan case 2 the constitutionality of Public Acts 1903,
No. 195, Sections 1 and 2, providing that transfers to lineal heirs of
2

In Re Estate of Fox, 154 Mich., 5; 117 N. W. 558 (1908).
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personal estate of less than $2000 shall be exempt from the inheritance
tax while, if the estate be $2000 or more, it shall, in its entirety, be
subject to the same, was questioned, on the ground that it was unjust
discrimination. The court held that there was no unjust discrimination,
since it treated all persons within the same class alike.
This same case was reversed at a later time, on other grounds. 3 The
Michigan Inheritance Tax Act was largely copied from a similar New
York statute, and adopted a certain form, from the New York statute,
to be followed by the probate judge. This form indicated that in determining the amount of personal property subject to tax, mortgage debts
should be deducted from the realty. Held; this form was not control.
ling in interpreting the Michigan statute, where the intent clearly appeared that mortgage debts should be deducted from the personalty
(This opinion superseded the earlier one.)
The Attorney General of Michigan (in 1923) stated in one opinion 4
that under the statute, the proceeds of a life insurance policy made payable to a trust company, though for the benefit of the insured's wife
and children, passes to the estate of the assured, and is burdened with
the inheritance tax.
In a leading Illinois case 5 (on the matter of interpretation of the
wording of statutes) the decision harmonized with practically all the
direct authority. The point was that the low rates applicable to the
"husband of the daughter" are also intended for the widower of a
daughter, although the daughter predeceased the testator. Likewise in
New Jersey, 6 where the court construed the phrase "husband of a
daughter" as describing one holding the relation of having married the
daughter; it was declared that there did not appear to be any sound
reason why the exemption should extend to the wife or widow of a
son, but simply to the husband of a living daughter; and the court
said that since the statute had not added any limitations, the relationship of husband for purposes of description should persist. The same
was held in one New York case. 7 In another (later) New York case
even the husband's remarriage during the testatrix's lifetime was held
not to bar the exemption.8 Concerning this last question - In an
earlier Pennsylvania case 9 a collateral inheritance tax exemption in
favor of the "wife or widow" of a son was held not to inure to the
benefit of such a widow who remarried before the testatrix died; the
court held that the exemption claimant was not the wife of the testa3
4

In Re Estate of Fox, 159 Mich., 420; 124 N. W. 60 (1909).
Op. Atty. Gen., 1923, '24, pp. 331, 332 (Mich.)

5 People of the State of Illinois v. Noble E. Snyder et al., 353 Ill., 184; 187
N. E. 158 (1933).
6

Clay v. Edwards, 84 N. J. L. 221; 86 Atl. 548 (1913).

7 In Re Woolsey, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 232 (1887).
8 In Re Ray, 35 N. Y. Supp. 481; 13 Misc. 480 (1895).
9 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Powell, 51 Pa. 438 (1866).
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tor's son, for he was dead, nor his widow, for she was again married,
and declared that the word "widow" was so entirely and exclusively
descriptive of an unmarried condition, having once been married, that
any other sense would be figurative; but the court did concede that if
the property had passed to the widow, and she had married before the
settlement of the estate, it could not be pretended that this would divest her of her right of exemption.
Vincent H. Meli.
REMEDIES OF LOWER RiPAiANS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL AND MUNICIPAL POLLUTION OF STREAMS IN INDIANA.-That any of the Indiana

stream pollution statutes can be successfully invoked by aggrieved lower riparians, with respect to either industrial or municipal pollution, appears to be ruled out by the very language of the statutes involved, as
well as cases cited in the annotations. Title 35, Sec. 201 Bums' Ind.
St. Anno., 1933, would appear to be inapplicable because it provides
that complaints to the State Board of Health, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, shall be made by a "common council, board of health
of any city or town, or board of county commissioners of any county,
or the trustee of any township in the state. . .

."

The fact that only

municipal authorities are named in the Act as being competent to file
complaints thereunder seems to suggest by implication that private persons are incompetent to petition the Board. So held in City of Frankfort v. Slipher, infra.
Likewise, as a matter of statutory construction, the State Stream
Pollution Control Board Act,1 supplementing Title 35, Sec. 201 et seq.
Bums' Ind. St. Anno., 1933, and repealing Title 68, Sec. 501-16, inclusive, offers little encouragement to downstream victims of stream pollution. This Act merely creates an administrative board known as the
"Stream Pollution Control Board of Indiana," and proceeds to define its powers and duties. The Board is given jurisdiction to control
and prevent "pollution in the waters of this state with any substance
which is deleterious to the public health or to the prosecution of any
industry or lawful occupation .... " But it must be noted that there is

no express provision in the Act relating to the filing of complaints by
persons adversely affected by upper riparian pollution. On the other
hand, the Board is given sweeping powers to initiate its own investigations and issue orders pursuant thereto. 2 It does not appear that the
Board's assistance has at any time been invoked by a private litigant.
Title 10, Sec. 2506 of the Indiana Criminal Code provides in part:3
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporationto throw, run,
Title 68, § 517, Bums' Ind. Stat. Anno., 1943 Replacement.
2 Title 68, § 521 et seq., Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., 1943 Replacement.
3 Title 10, § 2506, Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., 1942 Replacement.
1
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drain, or otherwise deposit into any of the waters of this state.., any
dye stuff, acid, coal tar, oil, log wood, or any by-products or derivatives
of any such, or any other poisonous substance, which of itself is deleterious to the public health or to the prosecution of any kind of industry. . . or lawful occupation.. ." The word corporation as used in the
foregoing paragraph apparently comprehends municipal corporations
as well as private corporations, its meaning being clarified in Sec. 2509
of the same title. But a more serious question is raised in the construction of ". . . or any other poisonous substance which of itself is deleterious to the public health . . ." Does the word poisonous comprehend
the discharge of sewage by municipal corporations into streams and
rivers? Probably not, although no cases have arisen on this point within
the last twenty years. In summarizing, then, the statutory remedies
available to lower riparians against industrial and municipal pollution,
it is the writer's belief that so far as the offending municipalities are concerned, this is no statutory remedy. With respect to offending industries, the adversely affected riparian prima facie, could have criminal
action taken to abate the nuisance under Title 35, Sec. 2507 of the
Indiana Criminal Code. 4 There are no annotations or citations to this
effect, however. So to recover damages, the riparian must in any event
look beyond the statutes.
In dealing with the problem of municipal pollution of streams, the
Indiana courts have not tried to distinguish between the liability of
such corporations acting in a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary,
capacity. In City of Valparaiso v. Moffitt 5 the city was held liable for
maintaining a nuisance by disposing of the city sewage in a stream flowing through plaintiff's property and rendering such property unfit for
use. The subsequent case of City of Richmond v. Test 6 denies liability
under the same circumstances on the theory that the city had utilized
the only practicable means at hand for dispatching its sewage. Although
this case constituted a radical departure from the rule in City of Valparaiso v. Moffitt, supra, the facts involved were analogous and the
the Appellate Court have no reason why the earlier case should not be
controlling. City of Valparaiso v. Hagen et al,7 following the Richmond case, reflected the inclination of the Indiana Supreme Court to
adhere to the rule in the Richmond case as laid down by the Appellate
Court, to the further discredit of City of Valparaiso v. Moffitt, supra.
The Hagen case was in the nature of an injunction suit brought by
lower riparians to preclude the City of Valparaiso from discharging
sewage into Salt Creek. Held, injunction denied. Taking cognizance of
the practical exigencies of the situation, the Court said: "The sewage
must be dispatched or the city abandoned... The facts present a case
4

Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., 1942 Replacement.

12 Ind. App. 250 (1894).
6 18 Ind. App. 482 (1897).
7 153 Ind. 1062, 54 N. E. 1062 (1899).
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wherein the principle of the greatest good to the greatest number must
be permitted to operate and private interest yield to the public good..."
Superseding the purport and effect of the preceding authorities, however, is the comparatively recent case of City of Frankfort v. Slipher.8
This is the most recent case in Indiana bearing directly on the question
of municipal pollution of water courses and the applicability of statutes
thereto. The Slipher case is cited and followed in Northern Indiana
Public Co. v. Vesey 9 and Zabst v. City of Angola 10 insofar as its
conclusions apply. So it must be observed that City of Frankfort v.
Slipher, supra, is controlling in Indiana today. It was an action for
damages brought by a lower riparian growing out of the pollution of
Prairie Creek by the alleged unlawful deposit of sewage therein. The
City of Frankfort appealed from a judgment in the plaintiff's favor.
The city conceded that a private individual has no right to pollute a
stream to the injury of lower riparians, but contend that (1) a different rule obtains with respect to municipal corporations, citing City of
Valparaiso v. Hagen 11 and City of Richmond v. Test; 12 also, that (2)
Title 8, Sec. 125-35, inclusive, Burns' Stat. 1926, Acts 1909 p. 60
(now Bums' Ind. Stat. Anno., 1933, Title 35, Sec. 201 et seq.) provided a statutory remedy of which appellee must fully avail himself before maintaining the present action. In affirming the trial court's judgment directing the City of Frankort to pay damages of $3962.07, the
Appellate Court disposed of the appellant's first contention by noting
the fact that in the instant case the appellant, by the expenditure of a
reasonable sum of money, could have financed the construction of a
sewage reduction plant, rendering said sewage inoffensive and innocuous to lower riparians. That this was not done was held to constitute
actionable negligence on the part of the city. The fact that the alternative method of sewage disposal was here available to the appellant appears to be controlling, and distinguishes this case from City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, supra, the latter case being further distinguishable
from the instant case in that it was an injunction suit rather than one
for damages. Appellant's second contention was disposed of by a judicial construction of Title 8, Sec. 125 et seq., Bums' 1926 Stat. (now
Bums' Ind. Stat. Anno., 1933, Title 35, Sec. 201 et seq.) wherein the
Appellate Court said: "The statute is not available to an individual
landowner like this appellee, who suffers a special injury different from
that suffered by the public. The individual landowner must seek relief
through the courts, as did appellee in the instant case ...."
8 Frankfort v. Slipher, 88 Ind. App. 356 (1928); Rehearing denied Oct. 5,
1928; Transfer denied, Dec. 7, 1928.
9
210 Ind. 338, 200 N. E. 620 (1936).
10 99 Ind. App. 111, 190 N. E. 891 (1934).
11 153 Ind. 337, 64 N. E. 1062 (1899).
18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N. E. 610 (1897).
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Aside from the fact that today a municipality might interpose as
a defense its inability to obtain priorities for the erection of a sewage
disposal plant, the foregoing analysis of City of Frankfort v. Slipher,
supra, would suggest that as the law now stands in Indiana, lower
riparians can maintain actions against municipalities for injuries resulting from stream pollution. Such complaints, under the reformed code
pleading in this state, could be framed to recover accrued damages in
addition to equitable relief by way of injunction. Offending municipalities are usually given a reasonable time in which to construct sewage
disposal plants or take other affirmative action before the injunction
sought becomes effective. But in any event legal damages are recoverable.
Turning now to the question of industrial pollution of streams, which
presents a clearer case, - a long line of Indiana decisions 1 culminating in West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack 14 uniformly hold that industrial pollution of water courses is enjoinable as a public nuisance,' 5
and, in addition, lower riparians have consistently been allowed to recover legal damages in such instances.' 6 The only divergence of opinion is found in methods to be used in computing .damages,17 but that is
essentially a problem in damages, and is not germane to the purpose
of this paper.
The essentiality of the offending industry has been accorded little
consideration in the courts of this state. See Indianapolis Water Co. v.
American Strawboard Co.,18 and cases cited thereunder.
By way of conclusion, then, it may be said that as is now the case
with municipalities, lower riparians suffering from industrial pollution
have an approved remedy of injunction, in addition to legal damages
accrued up to the time the suit is brought.
David S. Landis.
Norbert S. Wleklinski.

RESTRAINT

ON ALIENATION

OF PRoPERTY.-Where

the owner of

property creates a trust under which the income is payable to a beneficiary for life and it is provided that the interest of the beneficiary shall
not be transferable by him and that his creditors shall not be permitted
to reach it, the question arises whether these direct restraints on aliena13 Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 56 L. R. A. 899 (1900); Muncie
Pulp Co. v. Martin, 23 Ind. App. 558 (1899); Indianapolis Water Co. v. American
Strawboard Co., 53 F. 970 (1893).
14 164 Ind. 21 (1904).
15

16
17
18

164 Ind. 21 (1904).
164 Ind. 21 (1904).

Maddox v. International Paper Co. et al., 47 F. Supp.
53 F. 970 (1893).

829 (1942).
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tion are valid? Naturally the question also arises; are the courts in the
United States to recognize a spendthrift trust in that direct restraints
on alienation of property are created through spendthrift trusts?
It has been the policy of English courts to refuse to recognize a
spendthrift trust. The case, Brandon v. Robinson' is a good example
of the position taken by the English courts. In this case, the testator
left real and personal property in trust to pay the income to his son
for life and on his death, to pay the principal to his next of kin. He
further provided that the income should be paid into his own son's
hands. The son later became bankrupt and the assignee in bankruptcy brought suit in equity to reach his interest in the trust. Lord
Eldon in giving the opinion of the court stated in part that there
was no doubt the property may be given to a man until he shall become bankrupt, it is equally clear, generally speaking, that if property
is given to a man for his life, the donor cannot take away the incidents
to a life estate, and as has been observed, a disposition to a man until
he shall become bankrupt, and after his bankruptcy is over, is quite
different from an attempt to give to him for his life, with a proviso
that he shall not sell or alienate it. If that condition is so expressed
as to amount to a limitation reducing the interest short of a life estate,
neither the man, nor his assignees can have it beyond the period limited.
Therefore the interest of the beneficiary should terminate on his bankruptcy. The case Graves v. Dolphin 2 substantiates the decision of
the court in the above case.
The English view is maintained by the courts in Rhode Island,
Alabama, Kentucky and New Hampshire. In Tillinghast v. Bradford s
Judge C. J. Ames summarizes the position taken by Rhode Island
courts when he stated,
"It is quite clear that it was the intention of the testator to make
an alimentary provision for his son during life, which should give
him all the advantages of an estate in fee, without the legal incidents
of such an estate-alienability, unless by will, and subjectiveness to
the payment of the son's debt. Such restraints, however are so opposed to the nature of property-and, so far as subjectiveness to debts
is concerned to the honest policy of the law-as to be totally void,
unless, which is not the case here, in the event of its being attempted
to be aliened, or seized for debts, it is given over by the testator to
someone else. This has been the settled doctrine of the court of
chancery, at least, since Brandon v. Robinson 4 and in application to
such a case as this is so honest and just that we would not change
it if we could. Certainly no man should have an estate to live on, but
1 18 Ves. 429 (1811).

2 I Sim. 66 (1826).
3 5 Rhode Island 205 (1856).
A 5 Rhode Island 205 (1856).
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not an estate to pay his debts with. Certainly property available
for the purpose of pleasure or profit should be also amenable to the
demand of justice."
The Alabama courts, in R-ugley v. Robinson 5 held that spendthrift trusts are invalid as against the right of creditors. In this case,
property was given for the benefit of A and his family during A's lifetime and there was an express provision that it should not be subject to
the payment of any debt he may owe. Held that A should share
equally with the family and that except as to the property which was
to be used by A and his family in specie, A's interest could be reached
in equity by his creditors.
In New Hampshire, the courts have held that restraints on the
alienation of an interest absolutely owing to the beneficiary of a trust
are invalid, at least as far as the rights of creditors are concerned. A
recent case, Brahmey v. Rollins 6 is an excellent example of this. This
case arose out of a trust which had been created by the defendant's
former husband. By its terms she was to receive five thousand dollars annually but upon condition, the condition that the said annuity
shall not be assigned, alienated, or pledged in any manner or subject
to attachment or any indebtedness. The plaintiff obtained a judgment
and brought a creditor's bill to obtain payment of the money and the
court allowed recovery, and held the right of creditors to reach property
owned by their debtors "is a public regulation of property private
control."
The state of Kentucky is one of the few jurisdictions which allow
restraints on the alienation of legal interests. These cases however
allow only restraints against the voluntary alienation as was seen in
the case Sparrow v. Sparrow3 The court held here that the testatrix
had a right by her will to prohibit absolutely the sale of her property
for any period of time not beyond the limitation placed upon final
alienation and distribution of her estate. Kentucky courts refuse to
allow limitation on the creditors. In Smith v. Smith 8 the court said
in part that no man can hold as his own and enjoy property free from
the claim of creditors. The creditors' rights are conferred by law and
therefore cannot be set aside by the will of the testator.
The late Professor John Chipman Gray in his book on Restraints
on Alienation further strengthened the case against any restraint on
alienation of property. He said in part he believed that the English
doctrine was a wholesome one, fit to produce a manly race, based on
sound morality and wise philosophy. He went on to say that the
rapid growth of the new doctrine allowing spendthrift trusts was due
10 Ala. 702 (1844).
87 New Hampshire Rep. 290; 179 A. 186 (1935).
7 171 Kentucky Rep. 101; 186 S. W. 904 (1916).
8 24 Kentucky Law Rep. 2261; 73 S. W. 1028 (1903).
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to the influence of the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Nichols v.
Eaton; 9 to the spirit of the times which looked with complacency on
the failure to pay debts both public and private; to the reaction against
the doctrine of "laissez faire," of sacredness of contract, and of individual liberty, which were prevalent during the greater part of the
nineteenth century; to the spirit of paternalism, which is the fundamental essence alike of spendthrift trusts and of socialism. Mr. Gray
was particularly indignant at the decisions of courts who permitted
the beneficiary of a trust to retain what is necessary for his support.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Austin Scott in his "Law of Trust" 10
advocates that the amount involved in the trust should be limited to the
amount necessary for the support of the beneficiary. He disagrees
with Mr. Gray in that respect.
In the past forty years however spendthrift trusts have either been
upheld by decision or established by statute in many jurisdictions,
with some modification. Justice C. J. Morton in a leading Massachusetts case, Broadway National Bank v. Adams 11 stated the attitude
of courts of that state when he said,
"It is argued that investing a man with apparent wealth tends
to mislead his creditors, and to induce them to give him credit. The
answer is, that creditors have no right to rely upon property thus
held, and to give him credit upon the basis of an estate which, by the
instrument creating it, is declared to be inalienable by him, and not
liable for his debts. By the exercise of proper diligence they can
ascertain the nature and the extent of his estate especially in the
commonwealth where all wills and most deeds are, spread upon the
public records."
The state of California adopted spendthrift trusts with some modification. The court stated in McColgan v. 'Walter Magee 12 that a
spendthrift trust may be created in the rents and profits of realty
if the beneficiary is restrained from disposing of his interest only during life or a term of years; but where a trust is created to receive
rents and profits, and no valid direction for accumulation is given,
the surplus beyond what is necessary for the education and support
of the person for whose benefit the trust is created, is liable for the
claims of his creditors. The court concluded by stating that spendthrift trusts, inalienable by the beneficiary, and inaccessible to his
creditors during his life or for a term of years are valid in California.
Spendthrift trusts were held valid in Mississippi through the case
Mitchell v. Choctaw Bank,13 also in Lampert v. Haydel 14 a Missouri
91 U. S. 716; 23 Law Edition 254 (1875).
Scotts Law of Trust, Vol. I, § 152, p. 749.
11 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
12' 172 California Rep. 182; 155 P. 995 (1916).
13 107 Miss. Rep. 314; 65 S. 278 (1914).
9

10

14

96 Mo.Rep.439; 9 S.W. 780 (1888).
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case in which the state of Missouri went on record as favoring such
trust but the claims of the wife and children of the beneficiary for
support must be given consideration. In other words the spendthrift
trust is valid against all claims of creditors except the claims above
mentioned. The state of Georgia courts hold that if the beneficiary
falls within the classes marked out in section 108-114 of the Georgia
code, his interest may be made inalienable by the instrument creating
the trust. However in the case Maxwell v. Rice 15 a trust was created
for one who was apparently within the classes specified within the
code but the court held the creditors would be allowed to reach the
beneficiary's life interest. The case Sinnot v. Moore 16 sheds further
light on the subject. The courts held here that the beneficiary must
abide by the terms of the trust and not assign it to anyone. In the
light of the two decisions and the statute one must infer that a spendthrift trust may be created on condition that the beneficiary may be
reached by creditors but can not assign the trust to anyone.
The Illinois courts have adopted Spendthrift Trusts as was seen
in the case Congress Hotel v. Martin 17 where the courts held that
an owner of property having the necessary qualifications may dispose
of his property by will as he may see fit, with such limitations as
he may choose to impose not contrary to law. They went on to say
that the trustee can refuse to turn over any of the trust money to
the debtors of the beneficiary. But income from a spendthrift trust
may be reached by a wife in payment of alimony.' 8
Maine joined the group of states which uphold the validity of
spendthrift trusts. The case Roberts v. Stevens 19 serves to prove
the aforesaid validity. Briefly the court held the interest not subject
to the claims of the creditors and dismissed a creditor's bill.
Maryland's courts state that spendthrift trusts which secure income
and principal against creditors are valid but one may not create a
20
trust in his own favor, Johnson v. Stringer.
Other states which uphold such trusts are Oregon-Mattison v.
Mattison,21 South Carolina-Lynch v. Lynch, 22 this case it might be

mentioned was very important in that the decision was adopted by
the United States Supreme Court. Judge Dennis stated that in most
15 10 Ga. App. Rep. 643; 73 S. E. 550 (1912).
16

113 Ga. Rep. 908; 39 S. E. 415 (1901).

17

230 Ill. App. 619; 143 N. E. 838 (1924).
223 Ill. App. 549 (1922).

18
19
20
21
22

84 Maine Rep. 325; 24 A. 873 (1892).
158 Maryland Rep. 315; 148 A. 447 (1930).
53 Oregon Rep. 254; 100 P. 4 (1909).
161 South Carolina Rep. 170; 159 S. E. 26 (1931).
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all of the United States the spendthrift has been sustained. This was
to protect the donor's right of property and the right to choose the object of his bounty.
Finally some states have failed to adopt a statute or rule with
regards to spendthrift trusts. In this classification falls, Wyoming,
Utah, South Dakota, New Mexico, Nevada, Colorado and Florida.
Theodore M. Ryan.

THE EFFECT OF A SOLDIER'S WIFE'S SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE WHILE
THE SOLDIER IS STILL AL.vE.An interesting problem in domestic relations is found in the following situation. Mr. A and Miss B were
married. Mr. A was called into the armed forces and was sent overseas.
Later Mrs. A received an official telegram from the War Department
which informed her that her husband, A, was killed in action. Later,
Mrs. A met Mr. C and became his wife by a ceremonial marriage. After
this second marriage, Mr. A returned home very much alive thus showing that the War Department telegram was false. Upon finding his wife
married to Mr. C, A committed suicide. Two questions are at once presented: (1) What is the status of Mrs. A and Mr. C while A is still
alive? and (2) What is the status of Mrs. A and Mr. C after A has
killed himself? Because it contains elements abounding in our numerous war marriages of today, the problem presented for discussion is one
that seems certain to frequently recur for adjudication during the post
war years. Because of the public interest inherent in marriage, courts
in future adjudication will be called upon to make subtle distinctions
in distinguishing relations that were meretricious in origin from those
whose inception, although void because of an existing impediment, were
honestly entered into by participants of our armed forces.
In our case there are several important assumptions that we deem
imperative. The first is that the telegram from the war department, re-porting A killed in action, is officially cognizable in our courts. In the
instant case, we take judicial notice of the telegram from the war department. The, second is that both parties to the second or subsequent
marriage entered into that relationship in all good faith. As there is no
evidence to the contrary, we shall assume this to be true.
Semper praesumiturpro matrimonio has long been a universal maxim
of the law of domestic relations, and courts have been ever reluctant to
rebut this presumption. Schouler, in his Marriage, Divorce, Separation
and Domestic Relations, formulates the general principle: "It will be
presumed that where parties live openly together as husband and wife
for many years, a prior marriage of one of them to a third party has
been dissolved by death or divorce." 1
1 Paragraph No. 1252.
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An Illinois Court recently proclaimed the extent of these marital
presumptions in adjudicating In re Estate of Panico when it said: "It is
true that where a valid marriage is shown, a presumption exists that
the status of that marriage continues and it is also the law that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, a first marriage will be presumed
to have been terminated by death or divorce prior to the time of a second marriage by one of the parties because the law presumes that the
parties in contracting a marriage, and in subsequently cohabiting, were
innocent of immorality or crime, and that there was no legal impediment to its consummation, but such a presumption is not conclusive. The
second marriage being shown, the law raises a strong presumption in
favor of its legality, and casts the burden upon the one attacking the
second marriage of proving that one of the parties to the second marriage had not been divorced from his or her former spouse before the
second marriage. In other words, the law is so positive that it requires
a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage to take the burden of
proving it, notwithstanding it involves the proof of a negative. And the
presumption is not overcome by mere proof of a prior marriage, and
that one of the parties thereto had not obtained a divorce, because the
other party to such prior marriage may have obtained such divorce,
thus terminating the marriage." 2
A court in our jurisdiction stated the problem succintly in Jones v.
Millikin: "The law presumes innocence, not guilt, morality, not immorality; marriage not concubinage. It follows that there is a presumption that the second marriage is valid and that all obstacles thereto, if
any, had been removed. That presumption is not overcome by a presumption that a former marriage, once shown to exist, continues. The
presumption in favor of a sec6nd marriage is not conclusive. However,
one attacking such marriage has the burden of proving its invalidity." As the above court pointed out such a presumption in favor of the
second marriage is not conclusive and Schouler further states this in his
authoritative work: "Nor is a new marriage entered into by one spouse
in good faith and in full but erroneous belief that the other spouse is
dead, valid even after the lapse of the statutory absence; such parties
are not free to marry again, but only relieved of the worst consequences,
although one party honestly believes the other to be free to marry.
Some of the harsher features of the old law have been softened in our
own legislation and statutes are not uncommon which possibly extend
facilities for divorce from the old relation, and in any event protect the
offspring of a new marriage contracted erroneously, but in good faith,
by parties who had reason to believe a former spouse dead." 4
An example of progressive legislation, mentioned by Schouler, that
protects the children begotten of the subsequent and void marriage is
2
3

App. 585 (1923).
268 Ill.
42 Pac. (2) 467, 96 Colo. 279 (1935).

4 Marriage, Divorce, Separation & Domestic Relations, Paragraph No. 1128.

NOTES
a Massachusetts statute that reads: "If a marriage is declared void by
reason of a prior marriage of either party, and the court finds that the
second marriage was contracted with the full belief of the party who
was capable of contracting the second marriage that the former husband or wife was dead, or that the former marriage was void, or that
a divorce had been decreed leaving the party to the former marriage
free to marry again, such finding shall be stated in the decree, and the
issue of the second marriage, if born or begotten before the second marriage was declared void, shall be the legitimate issue of the parent capable of contracting the marriage." 5 Here we see an admirable legislative cushioning of one of the consequences that naturally follows the
rebutting of the presumption of the validity of the second marriage
where children are involved.
It would appear then, that when A returns the presumption of the
validity of the second marriage is rebutted, and the status of B and C
is, while A is alive, rendered illicit. Further, unless their relationship
has the aid of a comparable statute as quoted above, their children
would be tainted with illegitimacy. This, fortunately, is not the situation because A, by taking his own life, makes it possible to legally recognize B and C's continued cohabitation after A's death. As there's nothing to indicate that B and C had a new ceremony of marriage after A's
death, we must assume that there was no further ceremony but merely
continued cohabitation.
Authorities are to be found in dealing with the above situation.
Corpus Juris makes the statement: "Where parties to an agreement and
relationship which, but for the existence of an impediment would have
constituted a valid marriage continue in the relationship in good faith,
upon the removal of the impediment the law will establish between
them a valid common law marriage." 6
A. L. R. is equally clear: "The general rule is that, if parties desire
marriage and do what they can to render their union matrimonial, but
one of them is under a disability, their cohabitation thus matrimonially
meant, and continued after the disability is removed, will, in law, make
them husband and wife from the moment that such disability no longer
exists, although there are no special circumstances to indicate that the
parties expressly renewed their consent or changed their mode of living
after the removal of the impediment." 7
Learned authors on the law of domestic relations align themselves
closely to the encyclopedic rule. Schouler continues: "Where a marriage
entered into in good faith by one is void on account of a previous marriage of one of the parties, it may be validated by the removal of the
impediment and the continued cohabitation of the parties and statutes
5 General Laws of Massachusetts, Chap. 207, § 17.
6 38 Corpus Juris 1320.
7 104 A. L. R. 12.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

have been passed in many states validating marriages made where the
parties live together after the removal of an impediment, but these
statutes do not apply to illicit cohabitation nor make marriage contracts
not intended by the parties." 8
Bishop in language closely following A. L. R. says: "If the parties
desire marriage and do what they can to render their union matrimonial, yet one of them is under disability, as where there is a prior marriage undissolved their cohabitation, thus matrimonially meant, will, in
matter of law, make them man and wife, from the moment when the
disability is removed; and it is immaterial whether they knew of its
existence or its removal or not, nor is this a question of evidence." 0
Jurisdictions are numerous which adhere strictly to the general rule.
A Michigan Court in deciding a comparatively recent case, Hess v. Pettigrew, held: "While there is some difference of reasoning and ruling,
the decided weight of authority is that where parties engage upon a
contract of marriage, which is void because one has a living spouse,
which is unknown to one or both, uninterrupted cohabitation and reputation after removal of the impediment will produce a valid common
law marriage although the fact of the impediment will produce a valid
common law marriage although the fact of the impediment or of its
removal may not have been known to either. The principal reasons upon which the rule rests are that the initial relationship was intended to
be matrimonial, not illicit and consent to present marriage evidenced
by the ceremony continues from day to day and becomes effective as
a present taking in marriage on removal of the impediment." 10
As there was no second ceremonial marriage subsequent to A's death,
much would depend upon the recognition of common law marriages in
Colorado. If we are to follow the authorities, the relationship of B and
C following A's death, presuming they continued cohabitation and underwent no new ceremony would be one of common law marriage. We
need not consider the alternative because Colorado courts have long
given legal recognition to common law marriages. Klipfel v. Klipfel,"
Smith v. People,12 and Peters v. Peters,'3 are but a few of the leading
cases in which legal status has been given to such marital relationships.
Colorado courts, in situations comparable to our instant case, where
one of the parties was under a previous disability, have adhered strictly
to the general rule in establishing a valid common law marriage after
the impediment has been removed. In the leading case Poole v. People,
8

9
10

11
12
13

Marriage, Divorce, Separation & Domestic Relations, Paragraph No. 1129.
1 Bishop; Marriage, Divorce & Separation, Paragraph No. 970.
247 N. W. 90, 261 Mich. 618 (1933).
92 Pac. 26, 41 Colo. 40 (1907).
170 Pac. 959, 64 Colo. 290 (1918).
215 Pac. 128, 73 Colo. 271, 33 A. L. R. 24 (1923).

NOTES
that has served as a legal beacon, the court said: "If parties desire marriage, and do what they can to render their union matrimonial, but one
of them is under .a disability, their cohabitation thus matrimonially
meant and continued after the disability is removed will, in law, make
them husband and wife from the moment that such disability no longer
exists." 14
Davis v. People 15 was similar to our case in which a man in 1918,
believing himself free to marry, entered into marriage relationship with
his second wife and lived with her until 1927 and during those years
the parties held themselves out to be man and wife and believed themselves to be such, but as a matter of fact, the impediment to their marriage was not removed until 1921. Nevertheless, the court held the relationship, though invalid at its inception, was valid as a common law
marriage from 1921 because of the continuance of relationship after
removal of impediment in 1921.
In Mock et al v. Chancy 16 the court again substantiated the previous and well established principle, that a marriage invalid at its inception, because of an existing impediment, became a valid common
law marriage from the date of the dissolution of such impediment where
a continuation of marital relations was shown.
The Colorado viewpoint is further stated by the court in Poole v.
People, supra, when it laid down the rule that, "Upon the dissolution
of the subsisting marriage by death or by a competent decree of divorce, an intended marriage contracted in good faith by a party thereto
prior to the removal of the disability, is rendered valid and binding by
the continued cohabitation of the parties to such union, as the original
intention to become husband and wife is presumed to continue so as to
effectuate a valid common law marriage." 17
Aside from our jurisdiction but decidedly on the point is a statute
from Massachusetts, in which the legislature, again asserting the interest of society in the marriage relationship, has given validity to a marriage that occurs under situations similar, if not exactly parallel, to ours.
The statute reads: "If a person, during the lifetime of a husband or
wife with whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsquent marriage contract with due legal ceremony and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and wife, and such subsequent marriage
contract was entered into by one of the parties in good faith, in the
full belief that the former husband or wife was dead, that the former
marriage had been annulled by a divorce, or without knowledge of such
former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has
been removed by the death or divorce of the other party to the for14
15
16
17

52 Pac. 1025, 24 Colo. 510 (1898).
264 Pac. 658, 83 Coo. 295 (1928).
87 Pac. 538, 36 Colo. 60 (1906).
52 Pac. 1025, 24 Colo. 510 (1898).
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mer marriage, if they continue to live together as husband and wife in
good faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from and after the removal of such impediment, and the issue of
such subsequent marriage shall be considered as the legitimate issue of
both parents." 18

Here we see an ameliorative effort on the part of the legislature, applied to a situation that seems destined to appear more frequently in the
future. By passage of such a statute, other states could do much to
bring order to a condition that otherwise would require involved and
embittered adjudication.
It would make no difference in our case if the subsequent marriage
had been originally a common law marriage instead of a ceremonial one
because such a valid union is as legally potent as a statutory one in our
jurisdiction. The answer to our problem, then, following a great preponderance of authorities, both learned and encyclopedic, in addition
to previous Colorado decisions in similar situations, seems to lead us
to the inevitable conclusion that B and C, following A's death, have
conducted themselves in such a manner as to make a vailid common
law marriage out of their relationship. Since such marriages have long
been recognized by Colorado courts, no new ceremony was necessary
between B and C and from the date of the removal of the impediment
to their marriage, their marital status is valid for all purposes. It is to
be covered with the same protective mantles that the law grants other
valid marriages.
FrancisI. Paulson.

THE LEGAL RESULT OF MISTAKE OF FACT IN THE FORMATION OF
AN OFFER.-A mistake has been defined in the Restatement of Law of
Contracts as a "state of mind that is not in accord with the facts." I
From this statement we can see that when the contract was made there
was not a meeting of the minds.
In many cases a mistake of fact will avoid the contract, as set out in
Bigham v. Madison 2 where the court ruled that "it is not necessary
that fraud be shown in order to obtain relief from a contract. Innocent
and mutual mistake alone are sufficient grounds for rescission and other
relief." However, the rule laid down here cannot be said to be the set
rule for some courts hold contra.
To affect the validity or legal effect of an agreement, a mistake of
fact must be as to a fact which is mutual. That is, the mistake must
Is General Laws of Massachusetts, Chap. 207, § 6.
1 Restatement of Contracts, § 500.
2 103 Tenn. 358, 52 S. W. 1074, 47 L. R. A. 267 (1879).
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be as to fact which enters into and forms a basis of the contract. To
support this contention, the case of Ontario Paper Company v. Neff 3
states that where the freight rate in a contract to carry goods on a ship
was based on a mutually mistaken belief as to the capacity of the ship,
such mistake was held a good defense to an action for breach of the
contract. The mistake must be of the essence of the contract, the sine
qua non, or, as it is sometimes expressed, the efficient cause of the agreement. It must be such that it controls the conduct of the party. In the
case of Miles v. Stevens 4 the court said "the contract was invalid because of mistake as to whether a law would be passed which would increase value of land sold."
A mistake of fact could be said to take place when some material
fact which really exists is unknown, or some essential fact is supposed
to exist which does not actually exist. In re Welton's Estate 5 was a
case which held that "mistake of fact giving rise to right of recovery
exists either when some fact which really exists is unknown, or when
some fact is supposed to exist, which really does not exist."
"A mistake, sufficient to justify the reformation of a contract, must
be the mistake of both parties, and not that of one only," was held in
Dougherty v. Lion Fire Insurance Company 6 by a New York court.
In Barrell v. Britton7 it was held "to entitle party to contract to have
it reformed for 'mistake,' mistake must be mutual, and mistake by both
parties must be in reference to the same matter."
In many agreements we find the terms named by the parties are
so ambiguous that the so-called personality of the contract may be
material as evidence of the person to whom the offer has been made.
However, it is always possible for either the offeree or the offeror to
show that owing to some peculiar circumstance of the case the other
party did or acted as a reasonable man would have done, understood
the words in a different sense than the one meant. Hence if X says
"blue" when other people would say "green" and Y knows that by
"blue" X means "green" then the word "blue" must be interpreted as
meaning "green" when the offer is construed. For words have no inherent sanctity in themselves, but are merely labels by which we identify
things. The same is true of names. If X always addresses Y as Z then
Y can accept X's offer even though in terms it is addressed to Z. However, even though X addresses his offer to Y, Y cannot accept it if he
knows X meant Z when he said Y.
The effect of making or accepting a written offer is set out in the
Restatement which says,8 "One who makes a written offer which is ac3 261 F. 353 (1919).
4
5
6
7
8

3 Pa. St. 21, 45 Am. Dec. 621 (1919).
253 N. Y. S. 128, 144, 141 Misc. 674 (1931).
84 N. Y. S. 10, 41 Misc. 285 (1903).
148 N. E. 134, 135, 252 Mass. 504 (1925).
Restatement of Contracts, § 870.
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cepted or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he
should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is
bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or
of its proper interpretation. Therefore A, supposing a document presented to him by B is a receipt, signs it. It is in fact a promise to pay
a sum for which B has previously offered to settle a claim. B acts in
good faith and makes no misrepresentation. There is a contract unless
A is guilty of no negligence in supposing the document to be a receipt.
This can be further set out in the case of Griggs v. Griggs 9 where the
court said "a grantor's failure to read deed which he 'signed and to understand what he was 6onveying is 'negligence' and not 'mistake,' as respects grantor's right to reform deed."
A mistake must be as to an existing or past fact. The coming into
existence of any future fact must at the time of contracting have been
understood to be assumed by both parties. The view has been taken,
however, that there is no distinction between a contract made in view
of facts merely in contemplation and dependent upon future events or
contingencies over which the parties have no control. In Miles v.
Stevens 10 the contract was held invalid because of mistaken belief that
a law would be passed which would have increased the value of land to
be sold.
The subject-matter of a contract is very important in deciding what
the parties believed they were contracting for. If a man can show that
without any fault of his own, he has entered into a contract of a nature different to anything he intended, it is not difficult to see that the
element of consent is entirely wanting in such a transaction. Whatever
the real intention of a man may be if he so conducts himself that a
reasonable man would believe that he is consenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and the other party upon this belief enters
into the contract with him, then the man thus conducting himself so,
would be equally bound as if he first intended to agree to the other
party's terms.
All those who enter into a contract must believe that they can perform it and that it is to his own interest to do so, and likewise for the
other party. However, if this belief is false, the error will not avoid the
contract although non-performance by one side may relieve the other
from his liabilities under the contract.
A mistake as to the subject-matter of a contract will only avoid in
three cases." I (a) If the manifestations of intentions of either party are
uncertain or ambiguous and he has no reason to know that they may
bear a different meaning to the other party from that which he himself attaches to them, his manifestations are operative in the formation
197 S. E. 165, 167, 213 N. C. 624 (1938).
3 Pa. St. 21, 45 Am. Dec. 621 (1846).
11 Restatement of Contracts, § 71.
9

10
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of a contract only in the event that the other party attaches to them
the same meaning. (b) If both parties know or have reason to know
that the manifestations of one of them are uncertain or ambiguous and
the parties attach different meanings to the manifestations, this difference prevents the uncertain or ambiguous manifestations from being
operative as an offer or an acceptance. (c) If either party knows that
the other does not intend what his words or other acts express this
knowledge prevents such words or other acts from being operative as
an offer or an acceptance.
We can therefore gee that in the formation of a contract mutual assent alone is not enough to have a good and binding agreement. It is
true that the parties are bound by the meaning of a writing made by
them as properly interpreted, even though one of them is ignorant and
mistaken of the contents. Yet in many contracts which the courts have
held to be valid agreements and command the parties to perform the
contract, there never was a "meeting of the minds" between the parties.
"Meeting of the minds" as set out in Imperial Water Co. No. 1 v. Imperial Irrigation District12 means a definite proposal made by the one
side which was unqualifiedly accepted by the other. A New York court
held 13 a "meeting of minds" involving not only a common understanding of contract terms but also of identity of the parties is essential to a contract.
Courts today hold that the intention of the parties when they
formed the contract to be the basis for relief. If there was not a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, then there cannot be a contract between them, for they were thinking of things different than
their contract stated. In Housman Steel Co. v. N. P. Severin Company 14 the court held "to constitute a binding contract" the minds of
the parties thereto mus

meet upon the essential terms of the con-

tract. This may be further set out in Fernon v. Prudential Insurance
Company 15 where it was held "to make a contract there must be
among other things a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties
regarding the something at the same time."
Thomas F. Bremer.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDs WITH RELATION TO ORAL CONTRACTS OF

EMPLOYMNT.-The first Statute of Frauds was enacted in England
in 1677. The official title for this was, "An Act for the Prevention
of Frauds and Perjuries." The statute citation: Statute 29, Chas. 1-,
chapter 3. A copy of this statute is found in Williston's Cases on

14

62 Cal. App. 286, 217 Pac. 88 (1923).
Harding v. Knapp, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 224, 226 (1938).
49 N. E. 2d 552, 554; 316 Ill. App. 585 (1942).

15

162 S. W. 2d 281, 283, 284, .

12

13

o .......

(1942).
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Contracts.' The purpose of the statute is adequately expressed in
the following words of Corpus Juris Secundum, "The purpose of the
statute is to prevent fraud and purjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence on the unassisted memory of
witness by requiring certaini enumerated contracts and transactions
to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged." 2
There have been two States, of the United States, that have enacted the English statute, as such, but all of the States have enacted
statutes containing in substance, the same provisions.
For an example, take the State of Michigan which has the following statute:
"Agreements, invalidity of certain kinds in absence of a signed
writing. Sec. 2. In the following cases specified in this section,
every agreement, contract and promise shall be void, unless such
agreement, contract or promise, or some note or memorandum
thereof be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized, that
is to say:
1. Every agreement that, by its terms, is not to be performed
in one (1) year from the making thereof;
2. Every special promise to answer for the debt, default or misdoings of another person;
3. Every agreement, promise or undertaking, made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
4. Every special promise made by an executor or administrator,
to answer damages out of his own estate;
5. Every agreement, promise or contract to pay any commission
for or upon the sale of any interest in real estate." a
From the statute above it is readily seen that a great number of
every day contracts come under one of the five subsections. The
topic of this paper is but one section under subdivision number one, i. e.
How are oral contracts of employment affected by the ruling that
all such contracts not to be performed in one year must be in writing?
Since we are concerned with subdivision one there arises the question as to the reason this section is found in the statute. Answering
this in the words of American Jurisprudence: "The object of the
statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in setting up verbal agreements not to be performed within a year; it grew out of a purpose to
intercept the frequency and success of actions based on nothing more
than loose verbal statements or mere innuendos." 4
1

2

A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts. By Samuel WiUiston. p. 415.
Vol. 37, Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 513.

3 Michigan Statutes Annotated, by J. M. Henderson. Vol. 19, chap. 261; sec.
26.922.
4 49 American Jurisprudence, p. 383.
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Since it is not at all unusual that a contract of employment be
oral, just what effect has this section of the statute? Has it accomplished what it was intended to?
Contracts of employment, that have been adjudicated upon the
question of performance in one year were usually brought into court
with one of the following questions most prominent; When was the
employment to start? How long was the employment to continue?
Could the contract be performed in one year?
In an 1882 case, where a fifteen year old boy orally contracted to
work for the defendant until he, the boy, was twenty-one in return
for schooling, a watch, and a horse, the defendant broke this agreement. The boy sued the defendant for damages for breach of the contract; the defendant pleaded the statute of frauds. The court in the
following words held this contract void, because it was evident from
the facts -that this oral contract was intended to run more than a year
and that it was not in writing. "On the trial the plaintiff proved a
verbal contract to the effect of that specially declared upon. This
was void under the statute of frauds.. ." 5
From the above case we see the court, from the evidence, found
an oral contract made for a period of six years, thus bringing it within
the statute of frauds and making it void.
In an 1889 case, in which a contract to work was made orally the
fifteenth of one month, the work beginning the first of the following
month a question was raised as to the admissibility of this oral contract. The court held, that the contract was void, it was admissible
to show evidence of work.0 Also in 1934, in a similar case, deciding
the same question the court said, "A contract though under the statute
of frauds may be admissible if helpful in estimating damages. . ." 7
In both of the foregoing cases the court upheld the decision of the
lower court which was, declaring an oral contract for a year's services,
that were to begin more than one day after the making of the contract,
void, because it could not be performed in one year from the making
thereof as provided by statute.
The general rule as for a year's services to begin more than one
day after the making of the contract is set down in volume 27 of American Lawyers Reports, Annotated, in the following words. "An oral
contract for a year's services, to begin more than one day after the
contract is entered into, is invalid under that provision of the Statute
of Frauds making invalid a contract not to be performed within a
year." 8
5 Morse v. Burroughs, 48 Michigan 520, 12 N. W. 684 (1882).
6 Moore v. Capewill Horse-Nail Co., 76 Mich. 606, 43 N. W. 644 (1889).
7 Vanderhuff v. Parker Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 672, 225 N. W. 449 (1934).
8 American Lawyers Reports, Annotated, Vol. 27, p. 667. Also see cases in
the following annotations for various states holding this rule.
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There then arose in the courts a question as to how much writing
is necessary to take an oral contract, to begin in the future, out of the
Statute.
In 1914 a case was decided which involved this very question.
"Looking only at the correspondence, one is left in serious doubt as
to how long the service is to continue, and what salary is to 'be paid.
These are important elements in the contract, and they must not rest
in parol." 9
Thus in the preceeding case it is seen that the contract of employment must contain the length of time that it is to run and the
amount of money to be paid to the employee for any designated period
of time. There are other points that should be included, but since
they vary with each contract of employment there is no need to discuss them here. In general the contract should answer the questions;
Where the employment is to take place? What type of work is expected? It has to answer the questions; When the work is to start?
How long work is to continue? And at what rate employee is to be
paid? This applies to all contracts of employment, and those that
are to start in the future are required by law to be in writing.
The question now arises as to the status of contracts that are for
a year's service to begin at once. The general rule, in the words of
American Law Reports, Annotated volume 27 is as follows: "A verbal
hiring for a year that is to commence coincident with the hiring-or,
as some cases express it, a hiring to begin in present---is not invalidated
by the provision of the Statute of Frauds making contracts not to be
performed within a year invalid or unenforceable." 10
In a 1913 Michigan case, in which the oral agreement being sued
upon was one in which employment was to start the day of the making of the oral agreement and to be terminated at the end of one year,
the court held the oral contract of employment valid in the following
words, "We cannot agree with the contention that the statute of frauds
has any application here. The only agreement submitted to the jury
was one to be performed within one year." "From this case it is seen that a contract for a year's employment
to begin in the present is not invalid as to the Statute of Frauds. The
reasoning is that it can be performed in a year's time.
This possibility of performance has validated many oral contracts
that were on their face invalid. The essence of this rule is expressed
in an 1896 Michigan case, "The mere fact that a contract may or may
not be performed within the year does not bring it within the statute.
The rule is that if by any possibility, it is capable of being completed
9 Carroll v. Palmer Mfg. Co., 181 Mich. 280, 148 N. W. 390 (1914).
10 American Lawyers Reports, Annotated, Vol. 27, p. 663.

11 Galvin v. Detroit Steering Wheel and Windshield Co., 176 Mich. 569, 142
N. W. 742 (1913).
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within a year, it is not within the statute, though the parties may
have intended, and thought it probable that it would extend over a
longer period, and though it does so extend." 12
The general rule is reaffirmed in 1926. "This court has uniformly
recognized the rule that a contract is not within the statute if, by its
terms, it is capable or possible of performance within the year." 18
In a 1938 case this question of possible performance again arose.
The court citing the 1926 case held the oral contract to be valid on
14
the theory of possible performance.
The possible performance cases are decided upon the theory that
a contract can by its terms be completed in one year, i.e. by its terms
the contract does not intend the work to be carried over a period longer
than one year from the date of the making of the contract.
In the foregoing discussion, the following questions have been answered. As to the effects of subsection one of the Statute of Frauds;
requiring contracts that cannot be performed in a year are the following: One, all contracts that by their terms cannot be performed in
one year are void. By "the terms" usually means those terms that
specifically show that the contract must continue more than a year for
the employee to reap all the benefits of the contract or that both parties
intended to have the contract continue for a specific period more than
a year.
The courts construe contracts of employment that are to begin
more than one day after the making of the contract void if not in
writing.
The courts make an exception to the statute when an oral contract,
by its terms, can be performed within one year. This may seem very
liberal at first glance, but it is not because the contract must be made
in a way, so that if'all its terms are complied with, it can be performed within a year from its making.
The statute, through the courts, has forced men, making written
contracts for more than a year, to specify the salary and amount of
time of employment by adjudicating partially written and partially
oral contracts, with the amount and time in the parol contract, void
because of the statute. In other words, to make a valid contract for
more than a year, it must be in writing, and it must contain the compensation and specify the period of time the employment is to run.
Oral contracts that have no specific time for commencement have
not been adjudicated in Michigan as far as is ascertainable by the
writer, but for the states that have ruled on this point see 114 American
Law Reports, page 416 annotationNo. 5.
Lawrence E. B. Merman.
12

13

14

Smalley v. Mitchell, lI1Mich. 650, 68 N. W. 978 (1896).
Southwell v. Parker Plough Co., 234 Mich. 292, 207 N. W. 872 (1926).
Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America, 283 Mich. 561, 278 N. W. 687 (1938).
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THE VALIDITY OF A CHATTEL MORTGAGE GIVEN ON A STOCK OF
GooDs.-Whenever a person takes a chattel mortage on a stock of
goods in trade, he immediately is involved in an interesting and technical legal situation which requires a thorough understanding in order
that his security may be valid. For if the person is careless in drawing this type of mortgage or doesn't follow the statutory requirements
to the letter, he will be left with a void instrument or at best a security which will be worthless as against innocent third persons.
The basic problem involved in case of chattel mortgages is the
question of ostensible ownership. This in effect means that where
a mortgage is given on personal property and the property remains
in the hands of the mortgagor, the appearance is given to all
third persons that the mortgagor still owns the property. This is
rather deceiving to subsequent creditors of the mortgagor. For they
rely on the property owned by the debtor to base their estimate of
a proper risk for a loan to him. Thus when the personal property of
the debtor is covered by a chattel mortgage and he retains control
of it, third persons are misled as to the debtor's financial standing.
Because of this situation the early common law was reluctant to allow
personal property to be used as security unless the property was delivered into the possession of the mortgagee.
Now under the situation where the property sought to be used as
security was a stock of goods of trade such as groceries, paint, supplies,
etc., the objection of ostensible ownership and the other faults of
personal property as security if left in the hands of the debtor are
greatly magnified. This is because not only are goods left in the
debtor's or mortgagor's hands, if the goods are mortgaged, but the
stock of goods is being sold over the counter to purchasers with the
mortgagee's permission. Thus the stock is being sold and replaced
all the time. The important point then becomes just what is done
with the proceeds of the sale of the goods.
In order to better understand the problems involved in the giving
of a chattel mortgage on a stock of goods, a brief study of the early
common law is helpful. Under the common law, a chattel mortgage
given on a stock of goods was void unless the possession of the goods
was retained by the mortgagee. In England one of the first cases
on this subject was Twyner's Case.' The court held that if personal
property was mortgaged and the goods were left in the mortgagor's
hands with the power to sell them for his own benefit the mortgage
was void. This was the rule until the stringent effect of it was
changed by statute in England to allow the use of personal property
as security.
In the United States the effect of common law was relieved by the
enactment of recording statutes. Under these statutes personal property
1 3 Coke 80, 76 Eng. Reprint 809 (1601).
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could be pledged as security and the mortgagor could retain the
property in his possession with perfect safety provided that the chattel
mortgage was recorded. Thus the recording act allowed the recordig to become a substitute for possession of the goods in the hands
of the mortgagee. These statutes however were a protection only
insofar as the mortgagor retained possession of the goods so covered
as security. The mortgagee could allow the mortgagor to dispose of
the goods and still keep the benefits of the recording acts. However,
this is just the point which caused a great deal of difficulty. The
recording statutes would not go so far as to protect the mortgagee
if the power to dispose of the goods by the mortgagor was not carefully
defined and controlled. The sale, the proceeds, and use of the goods
must be carefully defined or the recording acts will not protect the
mortgagee.
Under the situation where a chattel mortgage is given on a stock
of goods and the mortgagor is left with the power to dispose of the
goods, a study of the decisions from different states will show how
the courts have dealt with the problem. For example, in Mann v.
Flower 2 the Minnesota court said, "The agreement between Taylor,
the mortgagor, and Flower, the mortgagee; made at the time the
mortgage was executed, that the mortgagor should retain possession
of the property, and sell and dispose of the same as his own in the
ordinary course of his retail business, without accounting to the
mortgagee for the proceeds of sales made by him, and without applying any portion of such proceeds to satisfaction of the mortgage debt,
was conclusive of an interest to defraud the creditors of the mortgagor,
.and rendered the mortgage fraudulent and void as to them." The New
York court held in Southard v. Benner 3 that if at the time of the
execution of a chattel mortgage on merchandise it is understood between the parties that the mortgagor may sell the stock and use the
proceeds in his business and the agreement is carried out, the mortgagor
making the sales with the knowledge of the mortgagee, the transaction
is fraudulent in law as against the creditors of the mortgagor.
In Buckstafj v. Snyder 4 the Nebraska court held that "where a
chattel mortgage gave the mortgagor until default, the right to remain in possession of said goods and chattels and to sell and dispose
of any of the stock in trade in the regular course of business, the
chattel mortgage was conclusively fraudulent as to creditors of the
mortgagor." Then in Potts v. Harvey 5 the court of New York held
that where the mortgage gives the mortgagor the right to remain in
2 25 Minn. 500 (1879); see also Pierce v. Wagner, 64 Minn. 265, 66 N. W.
977 (1896).
3 72 N. Y. 424 (1878).
4 54 Neb. 538, 74 N. W. 863 (1898); see cases on Creditors' Rights, Hanna
and McLaughlin, 3rd Ed., p. 153.

5 99 N. Y. 168, 1 N. E. 605 (1885).
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possession and sell the goods but with no provisions as to accounting
for the sale, is void as a matter of law even though the statute makes
the question of fraudulent intent a matter of fact.
In the case of Osborn v. Standard Secur. Co.,6 the Missouri court
said, "if it appears on the face of a chattel mortgage that the mortgagor
is to retain possession and have power to sell and dispose of the
mortgaged property in the course of his business for his own benefit
then the mortgage is fraudulent and void as to creditors and purchasers, because made to the use of the mortgagor, and will be so
declared as a matter of law without regard to the intention of the
parties."
From these cases it can be generally said that "where it appears
either on the face of a chattel mortgage or by parol evidence, that the
mortgagee has given the mortgagor power to dispose of the property
mortgaged, and apply the proceeds to his own use, or to such use as
he sees fit, the mortgage is void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith, without reference to the bona fides of the
mortgage debt, or the honesty of the intention of the parties." 1 Not
only do the above cases support this view but the following states
do also: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Another group of states hold that where the mortgagor remains
in possession of the goods, and has the power to sell the mortgaged
property, only a presumption of fraud arises, which, if not overcome
by proof, will make the mortgage fraudulent and void. For example
in Davies v. Turner8 a chattel mortgage was given on a stock of
goods. The mortgagor remained in possession and carried on the
business as usual. There was no provision in the mortgage that the
mortgagor should remain in possession. The entire transaction was
carried out in good faith and the proceeds of the sales were applied
to the conduct of the business. The court found that this evidence was
sufficient to overcome the presumption of fraud. This view is also upheld in North Carolina and South Dakota.
There is a third line of authorities which hold under the same
circumstances as above that the mortgage is not void nor does it
raise a presumption of fraud. The whole question of the mortgages
validity is a question of fact depending on the intention of the parties
together with all the circumstances of the transaction. The following
states uphold the rule: Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mass.,
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
6
7

222 Mo. App. 1186, 45 S. W. 2d 503 (1928).
73 A. L. R. 238.

8 120 F. 605 (1903).

NOTES
In the earlier cases in Indiana, the courts followed the rule that
where the mortgagor remained in possession of the goods with the
power to sell and could use the proceeds for his own use or to such
use as he saw -fit, the mortgage was void as to subsequent creditors
and innocent purchasers regardless of the intention of the parties or
the status of the mortgage debt. But this rule has been changed by
statute, in Indiana. This statute provided, 9 "The question of fraudulent
intent in all cases arising under the provisions of this act, shall be
deemed a question of fact. .. ." Thus in the case of New v. Sailors10
the court said, "The question of fraudulent intent is a question of
fact, and not of law. Therefore, until the contrary appears it will be
presumed that a mortgagor who is permitted to retain possession
of, and sell, mortgaged chattels, does so under an agreement to account as the agent of the mortgagee, and the proceeds will be regarded as applied to the liquidation of the mortgage debt, whether
they have been actually paid over or not."
The court of Iowa, in Meyer v. Gage Bros.1 said, "The special
finding of the court determines that said mortgage was not fraudulent
in fact. And the uniform holding of this court has been that the reservation by the mortgagor of the right to retain possession of the
property and sell it in the ordinary course of business does not render
the mortgage fraudulent in law."
The question which arises next is, regardless of the court's holding
as to the mortgage with regard to subsequent creditors and innocent
purchasers, what is the effect of the mortgage as between the parties?
Generally, it is held that the mortgage is valid as between the parties
regardless of mortgagor's retention of the goods with the power of
sale and use of the proceeds to his own benefit. For example, in Texas
in the case of Trie v. American Trust and Savings Bank 12 the court
held that a statute declaring that a mortgage on any stock of goods
daily exposed for sale shall be deemed fraudulent and void was intended
to regulate assignments of goods for the benefit of creditors, was a
mere declaration of the common law and as between the mortgagor
and the mortgagee the instrument is valid.
A question has arisen in several cases as to whether a mortgage
containing the power to sell and use the proceeds for the mortgagor's
benefit would be void as against a trustee in bankruptcy? It has
been seen above that such a mortgage may be void as against creditors
depending on the jurisdiction and the proof offered in the case. To
answer this new question, the Oklahoma court held in Turk v. Kramer13 that where the mortgagor retains possession with power to sell
Baldwin's Indiana Statutes Ann. 1934, § 8384.
114 Ind. 407, 10 N. E. 609 (1889).
65 Iowa 606, 22 N. W. 892 (1885).
12 Texas Civ. App. 259 S. W. 993 (1924).
13 138 Okla. 35, 280 P. 266 (1929).
9
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and the mortgagor is declared a bankrupt with a receiver appointedthe bankruptcy proceedings are, in effect a levy upon the bankrupt's
property by his creditors, and the lien created by the mortgage being
a claim not valid as against the creditors of the bankrupt, is not a
lien against the estate and the rights of the receiver are superior to
the rights of the mortgagee who has not obtained possession of the
mortgaged property with the consent of the mortgagor before the bankruptcy preceedings.
There has been quite some litigation concerning the agreement
which allows the mortgagor to retain possession of the property with
the power to sell the goods. This litigation has arisen over the sufficiency and necessity of this agreement. For example in the case of
Fletcker v. Martin 14 the court of Indiana held that "under the Indiana
statute (supra) making fraud a question of fact, a provision in a
mortgage authorizing the mortgagor to sell the mortgaged property
and apply the proceeds to the payment of the mortgage debt did not
of itself establish fraud; and that it was quite certain that the same
principle governed where a parol agreement was made after the execution of the mortgage." Then Nebraska in the case of Brinker v.
Ashenfelter 15 the court said "it is well settled that where, either by
the terms of the mortgage or by a contemporaneous understanding,
the mortgagor is permitted to sell the goods in the ordinary course
of trade for his own benefit, such mortgage is fraudulent and void as
to creditors."
The court of Missouri was very explicit when in the case of Osborn
v. Standard Secur. Co.16 it said, "The right given the mortgagor to
remain in possession, with power to sell the mortgaged property in the
ordinary course of business will not alone render the mortgage void;
there must be the right to convert the proceeds of the mortgaged
property to the mortgagor's own use. If the power to convert the
proceeds of sale to the mortgagor's own use appears upon the face
of the mortgage, then it is void by its terms. But if the power to
convert the proceeds does not appear upon the face of the mortgage,
but is in fact given by the mortgagee by agreement, with the mortgagor,
outside the mortgage, the same consequence follows." Thus it would
seem that whether the agreement giving the mortgagor the power to
sell the goods was included in the mortgage or made by a separate
agreement, the same result would follow; namely, that the mortgage
is void, or in those jurisdictions where the question is one of fact concerning the validity of the mortgage, it may be void if the facts so
warrant the finding.
In passing it is interesting to note what the judicial attitude is
concerning an agreement whereby the mortgagor is to apply the
15
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proceeds of the sale of the goods to the mortgage debt. Under the
situation the mortgagor assumes either one of two positions. He
either becomes the agent of the mortgagee, or he operates in his own
right and is bound to apply the proceeds to the mortgage debt. For
example the federal court held in the case of In Re Hartman17 that
the mortgagee could appoint the mortgagor his agent to take the
proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged goods and apply them to the
debt. Then in the case of State ex rel Kenman v. Fidelity & D Co.' s
the Missouri court held that where the mortgage provided that the
mortgagor should remain in possession of the goods and have the
power to sell them in the ordinary course of business with the provision that the proceeds should be accounted for and applied to debt;
the mortgage was valid since it was not for use of the mortgagor. The
Michigan court held in the case of Anderson v. Cook 19 that, "it was
not conclusive of fraud that the mortgagee did not foreclose his mortgage by advertisement, but permitted the mortgagor, his son, to sell
at private sale, and account for the proceeds which it appeared was
done in that case. The mortgage being valid, it was said that the
mortgagee was entitled to possession, and his security would not be
destroyed by his failure to sell in the exact manner provided in the
mortgage."
A question arises out of this last point, namely, if the mortgage
provides for the possession of the goods to remain in the hands of the
mortgagor with the power to sell the goods also in the mortgagor and
the provision that the proceeds be paid to the mortgagee to reduce the
debt, is the mortgage void if the mortgagor fails to pay the proceeds
over to the mortgagee? There is a split of authority on this question.
The Missouri court in Hopkins v. Hastings 20 held that a mortgage
was not void because the mortgagor did not pay the proceeds of the
sale of mortgaged goods which was so provided for in the mortgage.
On the other hand the federal court in the case of In Re Platts21 held
that the mortgage was void where the mortgagor made no attempt to
carry out the provisions of the mortgage which required him to account for the proceeds of the sale of goods daily and apply them to
the satisfaction of notes secured by the mortgage.
In some of these chattel mortgages on stocks of goods the provision
for applying the proceeds of the sale of the goods by the mortgagor
is so worded that only a part of the proceeds are turned over to the
mortgagee and the remaining portion is used by the mortgagor for
his own use. The validity of such a mortgage depends upon the facts
of the case and the circumstances of the transaction. In the case of
17
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for permitting, as it did, the mortgagor to remain in possession of the
stock of merchandise and to make sales therefrom, without requiring
him to account for but one-half of the proceeds of the sale therefrom,
and for the further reason that, with the knowledge and implied consent of the mortgagee, the mortgagor was permitted to withdraw
from the proceeds of the sale a sum of money, indefinite as to amount,
for his support, and for the operating expenses of the business."
In another Indiana case, Vermillion v. First National Bank,23 the
General Highways System v. Thompson 22 the Indiana court held that
the mortgage on a stock of goods was "void as to general creditors
court held that a mortgage which provided that the mortgagor could
sell the goods and use the surplus from the sale, above the expenses
incurred or cost of replenishing the stock, should be applied to the
mortgage debt was valid.
The Michigan court took a liberal view in the case of Leland v.
Collver.24 It held that a chattel mortgage was valid even though it
provided that the mortgagor could sell the goods in the usual course
of business and apply the proceeds in replenishing the stock and to
support his own family.
These last cases bring up the question as to the provision in the
mortgage concerning the sale of the mortgaged goods by the mortgagor
and the use of the proceeds to replenish the stock. The courts split
on this question; one group holding that such a mortgage is valid
while the other holds such a mortgage invalid. Michigan 25 and
Wisconsin 26 hold that such a mortgage is valid. Missouri also follows
this view when in the case of Liles v. Potter 27 the court said, "the
mere fact that the mortgagor is permited to use the proceeds of sales
to keep the stock up to its present standard does not make the mortgage fraudulent as a matter of law." On the other hand New York 28
and Minnesota 2 9 hold such mortgages void. The courts in these
states base their decisions on the ground that the property covered by
the mortgage was not the property of the mortgagee nor was it to become so, but still the property became subject to the mortgage lien.
To show how the facts of each case determines the question in
this problem the court of Missouri, which above held such a mortgage
with the "replenishment" provision valid, turned around in the case
22 88 Ind. App. 179, 155 N. E. 262 (1927); 73 A. L. R. 280. See also Bank
of Atchison County v. Shackleford, 67 Mo. App. 475 (1896).
28 59 Ind. App. 35, 105 N. E. S30 (1914).
24
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Smith v. Cooper, 27 Hun. N. Y. 565 (1882).
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